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COMMENTS
the Ferriss case? As to churches, such ordinances are not restrictive of the right
to practice a particular religion but merely restrict the right of a church to build
in a certain area and due to the obvious effect on property values, traffic, noise,
and the like, the exercise of the zoning power appears to be proper. This con-
struction can be easily extended, to most other uses that fall within the class
of quasi-public uses. Perhaps the better reasoned cases should support the validity
of comprehensive zoning ordinances, establishing private residential districts, when
churches or other quasi-public users seek admittance to an area so zoned.40
EvEar A. OLSON, JR.
THE MISSOURI MECHANICS' LIEN STATUTE-IS IT ADEQUATE?
The mechanics' lien is a creation of statute; it is a device not recognized at
common law.1 The purpose of the mechanics' lien statutes is to create a lien favor-
ing laborers and materialmen upon premises where benefit has been received by
the owner through an increase in the property's value or an improvement in its
condition because of the furnishing of labor and materials. 2 Without such a statu-
tory provision, a materialman or laborer would merely be a general creditor of the
owner, contractor, or subcontractor, as the case may be. According to some au-
thorities the theory of these statutes is that the owner shall not be unjustly en-
riched at the expense of the laborer and materialman who ordinarily fail to pro-
vide by agreement for security for their own protection.3
Generally in the United States there are two classes of statutes creating mechan-
ics' liens: (1) the New York system by which the right of laborers and materialmen
depends upon and is limited by the existence of a debt due from the owner to
the contractor-a derivative type lien;4 and (2) the Pennsylvania system which
gives a direct lien, sometimes said to have resulted from an agency created by
statute and sometimes from an implied agency vested in the original contractor.5
Missouri's statutes6 fit more into the Pennsylvania system of a direct type lien.
This distinction is important to note, because the result in a particular case may
depend upon which theory the legislature has embodied in its particular statute.
46. Church of Jesus Christ v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203
P.2d 823 (Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dis-inssed, 338 U.S. 805 (1949).
1. Van Stone v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 142 U.S. 128 (1891).
2. Colp v. First Baptist Church, 341 IIl. 73, 173 N.E. 67 (1930).
3. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1
(1920).
4. Baker Sand & Gravel Co. v. Rogers Plumbing & Heating Co., 228 Ala. 612,
154 So. 591 (1934); Rowley v. Salladin, 139 Conn. 642, 96 A.2d 219 (1953); Tice
v. Moore, 82 Conn. 244, 73 At. 133 (1909); James B. Clow & Sons v. Goldstein,
147 Ill. App. 571 (1909); 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 16.106F, notes 16-20(1952); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 669 (2d ed. 1920).
5. Tice v. Moore, sispra note 4; Prince v. Neal-Millard Co., 124 Ga. 884, 53
S.E. 761 (1906); PHILLIPS, MECHANICS' LIENS § 57 (3rd ed. 1893).
6. §§ 429.010, .100, RSMo 1949.
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One of the major problems of title examiners arising under the mechanics' lien
laws, and one not expressly covered by the Missouri statute, is that of secondary
payments by contractors to materialmen or subcontractors. This problem mani-
fested itself in the case of Herrman v. Daffln,7 where defendant owner, 0, paid his
contractor, C, the balance due on the construction cost of a home. C in turn paid
a part of this money to plaintiff materialman, M. C was indebted to M for materials
furnished on earlier jobs. M applied this payment to the older debts and then
filed suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien on O's house. When 0 .paid C he did not
specify in any way that his payment was to be applied by C to the discharge of
any possible mechanics' liens on the house of 0. When C paid M he did not specify
that the payment was to be credited to the part of his debt representing materials
furnished for 0's house. The jury found that the payment should have been so
applied by M and judgment was entered for defendant owner. On appeal, held,
affirmed. In the appellate court the decisive question was whether or not the
plaintiff, M, had knowledge of the source of payment made to him by C. It was
held that M had knowledge of facts which reasonably should have caused him to
know or make inquiry as to the source of payment.
According to case law there are two basic methods to handle the problem of
secondary payments by the contractor to the materialman or subcontractor. In
jurisdictions such as Missouri, which have a mechanics' lien statute giving material-
men and subcontractors a direct lien on the improved property, the general rule
applicable to payments by a debtor to his creditor is sometimes applied, and it is
held that the materialman has a right to make the application to other debts and
retain his lien.8 However this rule of payment is designed for the two-party situa-
tion of debtor-creditor,9 and when it is attempted to carry this rule over to the
three-party situation of an owner who has paid his debts, a debtor-contractor, and
a creditor-materialman, the courts tend to avoid the application of this payment
rule.1o Thus in the Herrman case the creditor-materialman was denied the right to
apply the payment from his debtor-contractor to debts other than those incurred
for the materials furnished to construct the owner's house, on the knowledge of
source theory:
The general rule in regard to application of payments is that the debtor
has the right to specify the account to which the payment will be applied.
If the debtor fails to specify, the creditor may make the application; and if
neither debtor nor creditor exercise his prerogative, then the law will make
the application as right and justice requires, usually to the credit of the
oldest unsecured account. This general rule is applicable to payments made
by a contractor to a materialman, but it is subject to the qualification that
7. 302 S.W.2d 313 (Spr. Ct. App. 1957); noted, Esely, Mechanic's Lien-
Mirsouri-Application of Contractor's Payments by Materialman Where Source
of Money Should Be Known, 24 Mo. L. REv. 387 (1959).
8. Bounds v. Nuttle, 181 Md. 400, 30 A.2d 263 (Ct. App. 1943); Gourley
v. Iverson Tool Co., 186 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
9. Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber Co., 5 Ga. App. 533, 63 S.E. 584
(1909).
10. Williams v. Willngham-Tift Lumber Co., supra note 9; Herrman v. Daffin,
iwpra note 7.
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if the materialman creditor knows or is chargeable with knowledge of the
source of such payment, then (the majority rule is) it becomes the duty
of the materialman to make the application in such manner' and to such
items as will give credit to and protect the rights of the person so supply-
ing the credit.11
Another way for a court in a direct lien type state to avoid the debtor-creditor
rule is to rely on a waiver theory. Thus in the Georgia case of Williams v. Willng-
ham-Tift L mber Co.,' 2 the materialman furnished a contractor materials for
the improvement of property belonging to different persons with knowledge of the
separate contracts, and the contractor paid the owners' money to the materialman
from time to time on account of materials so furnished. It was held to be in-
cumbent upon the materialman to keep separate accounts, and to find out from
the contractor on what contract the money was paid and to what account it
should be applied. If he does not do so, but rather applies the money as a credit
on a general account against the contractor, the materialman thereby waives
his right to a lien on the owners' property, and must look alone to the contractor
for payment. The court's reasons for this holding were stated as follows:
What is here held is not in conflict with the general rule of law that a
creditor has the right, in absence of directions by his debtor, to apply a
payment on account to the oldest open item of the account. This is the
rule as between the creditor and debtor. But, where the rights of third
persons are involved, the law will make the credit according to principles
of justice and equity. It will not permit the money of one man to be used
in payment of the debt of another man, or declare a lien on the property
of the man who has paid in full for all the material furnished to improve
his property, and thus relieve from a lien the property of a man who still
owes for the material that was used to improve his property.' 3
Therefore, the rule seems to boil down to this: The materialman-creditor may
apply payments from the contractor-debtor to the oldest open account in the
absence of instructions as to what debt the payment should be applied. However,
if the rights of a third party-owner will be impaired, the law will make the credit
as right and justice requires, usually to the account for materials supplied to the
owner's project.14
In jurisdictions having the derivative type lien statute a different method of
handling the secondary payments problem is followed, and here the problem is not
so acute. In the Illinois case of James B. Clow & Sons v. Goldstin,'5 money re-
11. Herrman v. Daffin, supra note 7, at 315, 316. This decision seems to
follow 2 RESTATEMENT, CoNT.Acrs § 388 (1932).
12. Supra note 9.
13. Supra note 9, at 536, 63 S.E. at 585.
14. Herrman v. Daffin, supra note 7; Williams v. Willingham-Tift Lumber
Co., supra, note 9.
15. 147 Ill. App. 571 (1909). Ill. Laws 1895, § 22, now repealed, read as fol-
lows: "Every mechanic, workman or other person who shall in pursuance of the
purposes of the original contract furnish any materials, ... or perform services of
labor for the contractor, shall be known under this act as a subcontractor, and
shall have a lien for the value thereof, ...in the same manner ...on the same
1961]
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ceived by the contractor from the owner for the purpose of purchasing materials
for a job was paid to a materialman whom the contractor owed for prior jobs. The
court held the materialman could not apply it to other jobs and claim a lien
against the owner's property even though no direction was given as to application
of the payment. The court said that it was manifest that if the materialman had
been paid for the material which went into the owner's building there could be
no lien, there being no daiom to support it. The court further said that by equitable
principles, the owner should not be compelled to pay the materialman more than
once for goods bought by another, when no contractual relations existed between
them, and no liability in law was incurred.
In the Connecticut case of Rowley v. Salladin,16 the contractor was employed
to construct a building on the owner's premises. The contractor abandoned the con-
tract before it was substantially completed with no fault on the part of the owner
so that nothing was due the contractor under the contract. The court held that
a lien of a subcontractor for materials furnished to the contractor was not enforcea-
ble against the owner. The reason for this was that under Connecticut statute the
subcontractor was subrogated to the rights of the contractor and when the con-
tractor lost his rights by abandoning the contract with the owner, the subcontractor
lost his rights also.
The effect of the derivative type statute is clear: If the owner pays the con-
tractor and extinguishes his debts to the contractor, then the materialman or sub-
contractor cannot obtain a lien on the owner's property because the materialman's
and subcontractor's rights are derived from those of the contractor and thus are
extinguished when those of the contractor are extinguished. Theoretically the
laborer's rights are the same as those of a materialman or subcontractor; practically
the laborers are either paid or work ceases. Therefore the discussion to follow is
directed primarily to the lien rights of the materialman and subcontractor.
The question arises as to what an owner can do to safeguard against the
establishment of a mechanic's lien where his liability is determined, as in Missouri,
by the direct lien type statute. One protective measure which the owner may adopt
property and to the same extent as is herein provided for the contractor. . . ." In
the case of Von Platen & Dick v. Winterbotham, 203 Ill. 198, 67 N.E. 843 (1903),
this statutory provision was interpreted to mean that the lien of a subcontractor
(which could include either a materialman or laborer) exists by virtue of the
original contract between the owner and contractor. The statutory provision which
replaced section 22 is now ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 82, § 21 (1957), and is worded some-
what differently but nevertheless receives the same interpretation as section 22.
Irwin v. Cullerton Corp., 13 Ill. App. 2d 742, 141 N.E.2d 77 (1957).
16. 139 Conn. 642, 96 A.2d 219 (1953). The statutory provision applicable to
the decision of the case is now CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 49-33 (1958). This pro-
vides: "No mechanics lien shall attach to any building or its appurtenances or to
the land on which the same stands in favor of any subcontractor to a greater extent
in the whole than the amount which the owner shall have agreed to pay to any
person through whom such subcontractor claims . . . .Any such subcontractor
shall be subrogated to the rights of the person through whom such subcontractor
claims." It is suggested that the reader compare this and the Illinois statute, set
out in note 14 supra, representing derivative type liens, with the Missouri statute,
cited in note 6 supra, representing direct type liens.
[Vol. 26
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is to make his check payable to both the contractor and materialman or sub-
contractor and thus utilize the cancelled check as an acknowledgement of payment
and satisfaction of his debt to both parties 1 7
One of the most effective measures is for the owner to require the contractor
to put up a bond to indemnify against mechanics' liens. There are certain features
of bonds to secure building contracts of which one should be aware. The bond
given by a contractor to protect the owner may either assume the form of an
undertaking to complete the building if the contractor does not and to pay the
labor and material claims if the contractor defaults in this respect, or, it may
obligate the surety to save the owner harmless from all loss resulting from a breach
by the contractor of any of the covenants of the building contract, In the former
case it is an obligation to pay such a sum of money as is necessary to carry out
in full all the terms of the building contract and to pay the laborers and material-
men, and in the latter it is an obligation to pay such damages as are ascertained to
result from the default of the contractor, without regard to the specific performance
of the contract. The obligation to pay labor and material claims is enforceable
whether mechanics' liens representing such claims are perfected or not, whereas
an obligation to save harmless from such claims becomes a liability only when
these claims materialize into a lien upon the property 18
If the owner pays labor and material claims to prevent liens from being per-
fected, the sureties upon the bond to "save harmless from liens" or to turn the
building over "free from liens for labor and material" will not be liable on the bond,
because the owner has deprived himself of recourse to the bond, since by strict
construction there has been no breach of the terms of the undertaking.19 Further-
more the owner can not definitely prove that laborers or materialmen would have
perfected their liens within the time limited by law, even if their claims had not
been paid.
An owner should also be aware of the danger in changing small particulars of
the original contract without consent from the surety. This matter should always
be considered in the undertaking so that if the original contract is altered later, the
owner will not lose the protection provided by the contractor's bond. The same
problem exists as to changes in the contract of suretyship.20
If the instrument signed by the surety is materially altered by the obligee
after he receives it, the surety is generally discharged. However if the alteration
is not material it does not affect the surety's obligation. Neither will the altera-
tion discharge the surety if he assents to it before or after it is made. It is not always
clear when an alteration of a written contract is material enough to discharge the
surety and thus a careful examination of the cases must be made to determine this
factor.21
17. Southwest Hardware & Lumber Co. v. Borgerson, 77 S.W.2d 195 (Spr.
Ct. App. 1934).
18. STARNS, LAw OF Suri-saip § 813 (5th ed. 1951).
19. Realty Say. & Inv. Co. v. Washington Say. & Bldg. Ass'n, 63 S.W.2d 167
(St L, Ct. App. 1933); STEARNS, sutpra note 18.
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Where, subsequent to the execution of the suretyship agreement, the principal
and owner amend their agreement or enter into another agreement concerning the
same subject-matter, it is generally said that the surety is discharged, though the
terms of the later agreement differ very slightly from those of the first. However,
the courts have not always been willing to follow this view to its logical conclu-
sion, and the surety has been held liable in a variety of cases. But in most of the
cases where the surety has been held liable, there appears to be a basis for the im-
plication of a consent to remain bound notwithstanding the change. As stated
before, it is the general rule that a surety is not discharged by a change if he
assents to it either before or after it is made. Courts generally seem to adopt the
view that a change does not discharge a compensated surety unless the change
causes injury.22
The owner may also resort to such protective measures as obtaining a waiver
from the materialman of his rights under the mechanics' lien law or obtaining re-
ceipted bills for all the materials purchased and used on the -building project. Al-
though either the waiver or the receipted bill is equally effective, the waiver is
simpler as it involves one document as opposed to a file of documents in the
case of receipted bills.23
In some states the right to a waiver is dependent upon statute, but this is
not the situation in Missouri, where there is no statutory provision for a waiver.
However, a waiver may be obtained by agreement of the parties or implied from
the circumstances on possibly either a contractual or estoppel theory.24 The chief
problem presented in obtaining complete protection through either waivers or re-
ceipts is accounting for everything lienable that goes into the building project or
getting receipts for everything lienable. An example of this difficulty would be that
of an owner who gets waivers from his contractor, subcontractor, and materialman,
on the materials going into the building project. Later other material not originally
contemplated goes into the project and therefore is not covered by the waiver.
Thus the problem is twofold, in that the owner must: (1) check his invoices to
see what material is listed as going into his project; and (2) check his project to
see if the listed materials actually did go into the project. If there is a discrepancy
between his invoices and materials actually used then the possibility of a lien
exists as to the unlisted material despite a previous waiver or receipted bill.
Furthermore the owner has a problem of ascertaining how far down the line of
subcontractors and materialmen he must go to obtain waivers or receipted bills.
Under the Missouri statute it is at least theoretically possible for subcontractors
and materialmen down to the producer of the raw materials to obtain a lien. An
example of this would be the owner who gets waivers or receipts from the con-
tractor who built his house and the lumberyard who supplied the lumber only to
22. Ibid.
23. As a practical matter, the solution to this problem sometimes lies in the
selection or preparation of a good waiver form. An excellent form prepared by the
Kansas City Title Insurance Co. is reprinted in PniMnSON & EcHAxurr, MissouRI
PRAcrICm, LEGAL FoRMs § 955 (1960).
24. Moon v. Brown, 172 Mo. App. 516, 158 S.W. 79 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913).
[Vol. 26
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have the mill which produced the lumber and sold it to the lumberyard file a lien
because the lumberyard did not pay the mill. As a practical matter the owner
cannot obtain waivers from all the possible materialmen and subcontractors, down
to the original lumberman or the producer of the raw materials, and must content
himself with stopping somewhere along this chain.
It has been suggested that the best protection for the owner is the careful
selection of a reliable contractor.2 5
Perhaps what is most needed to protect the rights of the owner is a thorough
revision of the Missouri mechanics' lien statute. The first mechanics' lien statute
in this country was adopted by Maryland in 1791.26 The basic purpose of this
statute was to assist in building up the country by attracting laborers and crafts-
men to the building field.2 The first Missouri mechanics' lien statute was also
adopted at a time when the state was a frontier, and thus it suited the needs of
frontier growth and development by providing incentive to engage in the building
industry.28
Today the situation is almost the reverse as there is no scarcity of labor in
the building industry and the problem is how to provide this industry with full
employment by adopting legislation which will attract people to buy and build
their own homes.29 The effect of mechanics' lien statutes, such as the one Missouri
has now, is to make buying and building homes financially hazardous because of
the potential double liability which will be imposed upon the home owner if he
has not strictly complied with the technical provisions governing payments due,
and to become due, during the construction process.80 Another justification in
granting less statutory protection to the mechanic is that it will discourage both
materialmen and subcontractors from furnishing material and labor to contractors
who are poor credit risks.
There are other revisions which need to be made in the Missouri statute. One
deals with the time limit allowed contractors and subcontractors for the filing of a
mechanic's lien. A mechanic's lien takes precedence over subsequent encum-
brances. Therefore as long as the possibility exists that a mechanic's lien will be filed
against the property, a mortgagee or bona fide purchaser of the property is in a
secondary position, and thus with the statutory filing limit as long as it is the
precarious position of the mortgagee is prolonged for a period longer than is neces-
sary.31 The position of the mortgagee is related somewhat to that of the owner in
the Herrman case.
Another problem which deserves mention is the ambiguity which arises under
the statute as to who is or is not an original contractor. The statute gives original
contractors six months in which to file their mechanics' liens while journeymen
25. See Esely, sunpra note 7.
26. Md. Acts 1791, ch. 45.
27. Stalling, The Need for Special, Simplified Mechanics' Lien Acts Applicable
to Home Construction, 5 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROB. 592 (1938).
28. Note, 17 U. KAN. Crry L. Rnv. 130, 131 (1949).
29. Stalling, supra note 27, at 592.
30. Stalling, supra note 27, at 592, 593.
31. Supra; note 28, at 131.
19611
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and day laborers have sixty days and other persons (including materialmen) have
four months to do so. In Davidson v. Fisher,32 the court said that a materialman
who deals directly with the owner has four months in which to file his lien. How-
ever in B. C. Robinson Lumber Co. v. Baugkzer,33 the court applied what is con-
sidered the correct rule and held that a materialman who deals directly with the
owner is an original contractor and thus has six months in which to file.34
Amendments to the present Missouri act would be of some value, but would
not make the act satisfactory in at least one important area, viz., home construc-
tion. It has been suggested that there is need for a mechanics' lien statute which
is specifically adapted to home construction.35 Would the proposed Uniform
Mechanics' Lien Act be an answer to the problem? The proposed Uniform Mechan-
ics' Lien Act has not been accorded general acceptance by the states, and seems
to be moulded from a compromise between the New York and Pennsylvania sys-
tems. 6 The Uniform Act reduces the possibility of double liability on the part of
the home owner because lien claimants, except laborers, may recover only the
balance of the contract price fixed by the contract of the contractor or subcon-
tractor. Therefore the owner who has complied with the provisions of the lien act
cannot be required to pay the same debt twice.3T The Uniform Act requires that
all persons, except laborers and others who contract directly with the owner, give
the owner a written notice of intention to claim a lien. Such notice must be given
not later than thirty days after construction begins or not later than the day
the lienor's construction work is completed, whichever period is longer38 The
owner, upon receipt of this notice, is required to hold enough money to pay
off the lienor's debt. The lien may be filed at any time during the progress
of the work, but not later than three months after final performance of
labor or services by the lienor. Thus the Uniform Act forces subcontractors and
materialmen to elect to exercise their rights of lien at a time prior to that when an
owner usually pays the contractor. 39 This, of course, will inform the owner as to
who will have a right to a lien against his property.
The Act has been criticized on the basis that it will not reduce the difficulties
imposed by existing laws on the home owner because the causes underlying these
difficulties have not been dealt with; but rather it has substituted new procedure
moulded out of the old philosophy.40 It has been suggested that what is needed is
a procedure based on a philosophy which rejects the principle that in a field of
32. 258 S.W.2d 297, 304 (Spr. Ct. App. 1953).
33. 258 S.W.2d 259 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953).
34. Eckhardt, Property, 19 Mo. L. REv. 335, at 341, 342 (1954). Professor
Eckhardt goes into a more detailed discussion of this problem and suggests a
thorough revision of the Missouri Mechanics' 'Lien Statute.
35. Stalling, supra note 27, at 595.
36. Cushman, The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Law, 80 U. PA. L. REV.
1083, 1085 (1932).
37. Id. at 1089; PROPOSED UNIFOvM MECHANiCS' LImE Acr § 2.
38. Cushman, supra note 36, at 1086; PROPOSED UNIFORM MEcmaNIcs' LIEN
Acr § 4.
39. Cushman, supra note 36, at 1088; PRoPosED UNIFORM MECHAIcs' LIEN
AcT § 17.
40. Stalling, supra note 27, at 596.
[Vol. 26
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home construction it is essential for the construction industry to enjoy, at the ex-
pense of the home-owning group, a special protection of the extent and character
usually granted.4' As it is socially desirable to encourage the home-owning group,
the laws should be designed to accomplish that purpose. Despite this, the home-
owning group is subjected to mechanics' lien laws which make no distinctions, and
which completely fail to reckon with the wide disparity between the ordinary small
home-owner, unversed in legal technicalities, and the owners of commercial build-
ings who may reasonably be presumed to have knowledge of the legal requirements
and are equipped to handle them in the ordinary course of business. The smallest
home-owner, during the construction process, is thus subjected to the same techni-
cal and burdensome provisions as is the owner of the Empire State Building. 42
Therefore as the Uniform Act makes no distinction between the small home-owning
group and the large commercial building group, and, like existing mechanics' lien
laws, applies equally to all, it appears to be inadequate.
The question arises as to what form a mechanics' lien statute applicable to
the construction of small homes should take. One authority in the field suggests
that there are three paramount interests to consider: (1) the home owner, (2)
the lender, and (3) the building industry.43
From the home owner's standpoint the possibility of being subjected to dou-
ble liability, i.e., to the contractor and materialman or subcontractor, can be
eliminated by limiting a right of lien only to persons to whom the owner is di-
rectly and legally committed. Also there should be a minimum amount set for
which a lien can be obtained, e.g., in Pennsylvania no lien can be obtained for
debts under one hundred dollars. Thus a statute limiting the owner's liability
would place a premium on prompt payments as they could be made without any
delay to investigate the extent of the contractor's debts to subcontractors and
materialmen.44
In considering the position of the lender, it should be remembered that most
people borrow the funds with which to finance the construction of their homes.
Thus the lender, in many respects on a par with the owner, is justly entitled to
some protection in order to keep down the cost of financing.45
As for the position of the building industry, i.e., contractor, subcontractor, and
materialmen, it should be remembered that they have other available legal remedies
besides the mechanics' lien, e.g., an action at law on the contract. However their
right to a lien need not be eliminated completely, but merely restricted so that it
can be brought to bear against only those to whom they are directly and legally
committed.46
In conclusion, the General Assembly should take a long look at the present
Missouri Mechanics' Lien Statute with a view toward clearing out the inequitable
situations which may arise under the enactment. DONALD E. CHANEY
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Stalling, supra note 27, at 598.
44. Id. at 598, 599.
45. Id. at 599.
46. Id. at 599, 600.
1961]
9
Chaney: Chaney: Missouri Mechanics' Lien Statute
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
